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Additional info for Genesis and Structure of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy)
It's going to hence be topic and not simply substance. 23 it's in this element that Hegel's philosophy, as a phe':: · nomenology, differs from Kantian mirrored image or even from Schelling's transcendental idealism. we've already quoted a textual content of Schelling's which defines the viewpoint of tran': · scendental ideafsm as wisdom of data insofar because it is only subjective. Schelling starts, certainly, by way of assuming philosophical self-consciousness (what Hegel calls technology )� and he exhibits how universal attention is to arrive this pre meant technology by means of reflecting again on itself. Empirical knowl part is to be measured opposed to philosophic " fact, "but the place technology arises first, neither it nor the rest justifies itself as essence or because the in-itself; and with no whatever of that sort no try turns out attainable" (PE, I, 72;. PG, 70; PM, 139 ) . in truth, awareness needs to b e taken because it offers itself with out but being interpreted. Now there are moments in !! l. ! ()r to be wakeful is to tell apart what one is aware of from oneself, to differentiate it and on the s ame time to narrate to !! = : "Consciousness distinguishes anything from itself to which, 22. Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, II, eighty. 23. Cf. the preface (PE, I, 17; PG, 19; PM, eighty) : "According to my viewpoint, as a way to be justified purely in the course of the presenta tion of the approach, every little thing relies on this element : to recognize and show the genuine no longer e. nly as substance but in addition as topic. "]Cf. additionally PE, I, 2 1 ; PG, 22; PM, eighty three : "the have to characterize absolutely the as subjec t. " 22 / GENERALITIE S accurately, it relates» ( PE, I, seventy two; PG, 70; PM, 139 ) . For conscious111ls s, being is for-it; even as, cognizance posits being as in-itself, as exterior to that relation. "The element of in-itself is named fact" ( PE, I, seventy three ; PG, 70; PM, 139 ) . therefore awake ness is aware whatever : it has walk in the park, and it lays declare to a fact self sufficient of its sure bet. NoW if we, that's, philoso phers, contemplate wisdom as our item, then its in-itself is its being-for-us. the reality of information, then, lies within the wisdom of data, in philosophic attention. The degree opposed to which universal recognition' wisdom is in comparison is that wisdom of data which Fichte and Schelling presuppose firstly. yet if that's the case this degree is a part of philosophic realization and never of universal attention. it truly is externally imposed at the latter, and we don't see why universal con sCio1l:sness is certain to just accept it : 'The essence, or the criterion, may lie in us, and that which will be in comparison to it, that approximately which, via this comparability, a call could be made wouldn't unavoidably be certain to realize [i. e. , settle for] it" ( PE, I, seventy three; PG, seventy one ; PM, a hundred and forty ) . accordingly, out of the ordinary wisdom needs to attempt itself; the thinker desire simply notice its adventure. certainly, the degree that awareness makes use of lies inside of itself, now not outdoor in a philosophic wisdom that continues to be alien to it : "Consciousness carrie s its personal degree inside itself; learn the following could be .